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Abstract
We analyze the problem of defining well-
founded semantics for ordered logic programs
within a general framework based on alternating
fixpoint theory. We start by showing that gen-
eralizations of existing answer set approaches to
preference are too weak in the setting of well-
founded semantics. We then specify some infor-
mal yet intuitive criteria and propose a seman-
tical framework for preference handling that is
more suitable for defining well-founded seman-
tics for ordered logic programs. The suitability
of the new approach is convinced by the fact that
many attractive properties are satisfied by our se-
mantics. In particular, our semantics is still cor-
rect with respect to various existing answer sets
semantics while it successfully overcomes the
weakness of their generalization to well-founded
semantics. Finally, we indicate how an exist-
ing preferred well-founded semantics can be cap-
tured within our semantical framework.
Keywords: well-founded semantics, preference, alter-
nating fixpoints, extended logic programs.
1 Introduction
Preferences constitute a very natural and effective way
of resolving indeterminate situations. For example, in
scheduling not all deadlines may be simultaneously satis-
fiable, and in configuration various goals may not be si-
multaneously met. Preferences among deadlines and goals
may allow for an acceptable, non-optimal solution. In le-
gal reasoning, laws may apply in different situations, but
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laws may also conflict with each other. Conflicts are re-
solved by appeal to higher-level principles such as author-
ity or recency. So federal laws will have a higher priority
than state laws, and newer laws will take priority over old.
Further preferences, such as authority holding sway over
recency, may also be required. In fact, while logical prefer-
ence handling constitutes already an indispensable means
in legal reasoning systems (cf. [16, 22]), it is also advanc-
ing in other application areas such as intelligent agents and
e-commerce [18], information-site selection [14], and the
resolution of grammatical ambiguities [11].
The increasing practical interest in preferences is also re-
flected by the large number of proposals for preference han-
dling in logic programming, including [23, 6, 15, 31, 17, 8,
13, 28], and related areas, such as default logic [3, 5, 12]. A
common approach in such work has been to employ meta-
formalisms for characterizing “preferred answer sets”. This
has led to a diversity of approaches that are hardly compa-
rable due to considerably different methods of formal char-
acterization. As a consequence, there is no homogeneous
account of preference.
In [24], we started addressing this shortcoming by propos-
ing a uniform semantical framework for extended logic
programming with preferences. To be precise, we develop
an (alternating) fixpoint theory for so-called ordered logic
programs, building on the basic ideas in [27]. An ordered
logic program is an extended logic program whose rules
are subject to a strict partial order. In analogy to standard
logic programming, such a program is then interpreted by
means of an associated fixpoint operator. Different seman-
tics are obtained by distinguishing different subsets of the
respective set of alternating fixpoints. As a result, several
different approaches to defining preferred answer sets, in-
cluding [9, 10, 13], can all be captured within our frame-
work and each of these preference strategies is based on
an operator, which plays the same role as the consequence
operator in the setting of normal logic programs.
In this paper, we show that the preference strategies for
defining answer sets turn out to be too weak in the setting
of well-founded semantics. For this reason, we propose
a new approach to preference handling for logic programs
that seems to be more appropriate for well-founded seman-
tics. In fact, we show that for a resulting instance of this
approach some attractive properties. We also discuss the
relation of our preferred well-founded semantics to other
approaches [21, 6, 30].
2 Definitions and notation
An extended logic program is a finite set of rules of the
form
L0 ← L1, . . . , Lm, not Lm+1, . . . , not Ln, (1)
where n ≥ m ≥ 0, and each Li (0 ≤ i ≤ n) is a lit-
eral, ie. either an atom A or the negation ¬A of A. The set
of all literals is denoted by Lit . Given a rule r as in (1),
we let head(r) denote the head, L0, of r and body(r)
the body, {L1, . . . , Lm, not Lm+1, . . . , not Ln}, of r.
Further, let body+(r) = {L1, , . . . , Lm} and body−(r) =
{Lm+1, . . . , Ln}. A program is called basic if body−(r) =
∅ for all its rules; it is called normal if it contains no classi-
cal negation symbol ¬.
We define the reduct of a rule r as r+ = head(r) ←
body
+(r). The reduct, ΠX , of a program Π relative to a
set X of literals is defined by
ΠX = {r+ | r ∈ Π and body−(r) ∩X = ∅}.
A set of literals X is closed under a basic program Π iff
for any r ∈ Π, head(r) ∈ X whenever body+(r) ⊆ X .
We say that X is logically closed iff it is either consistent
(ie. it does not contain both a literal A and its negation¬A)
or equals Lit . The smallest set of literals which is both
logically closed and closed under a basic program Π is de-
noted by Cn(Π). With these formalities at hand, we can
define answer set semantics for extended logic programs:
A set X of literals is an answer set of a program Π iff
Cn(ΠX) = X .
For capturing even more semantics within a similar frame-
work, van Gelder defines in [27] the operator CΠ(X) as
Cn(ΠX). It is important to note that the operator CΠ is
anti-monotonic, which implies that the operator AΠ(X) =
CΠ(CΠ(X)) is monotonic. A fixpoint of AΠ is called an
alternating fixpoint for Π. Different semantics are cap-
tured by distinguishing different groups of fixpoints of AΠ.
For instance, given a program Π, the least alternating fixed
point of AΠ is known to amount to its well-founded seman-
tics. Answer sets of Π are simply alternating fixed points
of AΠ that are also fixed points of CΠ.
Alternative inductive characterizations for the operators
Cn , CΠ, and AΠ can be obtained by appeal to immediate
consequence operators [26, 19]. Let Π be a basic program
and X a set of literals. The immediate consequence opera-
tor TΠ is defined as follows:
TΠX = {head(r) | r ∈ Π and body(r) ⊆ X}
if X is consistent, and TΠX = Lit otherwise. Iterated
applications of TΠ are written as T jΠ for j ≥ 0, where
T 0ΠX = X and T iΠX = TΠT
i−1
Π X for i ≥ 1. It is well-
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A reduction from extended to basic programs is avoidable
with an extended consequence operator: Let Π be an ex-
tended program and X and Y be sets of literals. The ex-
tended immediate consequence operator TΠ,Y is defined
as follows:
TΠ,YX = {head(r) | r ∈ Π, body
+(r) ⊆ X, (2)
and body−(r) ∩ Y = ∅}
if X is consistent, and TΠ,YX = Lit otherwise. Iter-
ated applications of TΠ,Y are written as those of TΠ above.
Clearly, we have TΠ,∅X = TΠX for any basic program Π
and TΠ,YX = TΠY X for any extended program Π. Ac-





Π,X∅. Finally, for dealing with the individ-
ual rules in (2), we rely on the notion of activeness:1 Let
X,Y ⊆ Lit be two sets of literals in a program Π. A rule
r in Π is active wrt the pair (X,Y ), if body+(r) ⊆ X
and body−(r) ∩ Y = ∅. Alternatively, we thus have that
TΠ,YX = {head(r) | r ∈ Π is active wrt (X,Y )}.
Lastly, an ordered logic program2 is simply a pair (Π, <),
where Π is an extended logic program and < ⊆ Π×Π is
an irreflexive and transitive relation. Given, r1, r2 ∈ Π,
the relation r1 < r2 is meant to express that r2 has higher
priority than r1.3
3 Preferred (alternating) fixpoints
We start by describing the semantical framework given in
[24], while concentrating on the formal details needed for
capturing the approach introduced in [28]. The formal de-
velopment of the approach in [8] and [13] is analogous and
thus omitted here.
1Although activeness is implicitly present in standard logic
programming (cf. definition of TΠ,Y X), the term as such was
(to the best of our knowledge) coined in approaches dealing with
preferences in default logic [3, 5]. There, however, activeness
additionally stipulated that head(r) 6∈ X in order to prevent mul-
tiple applications of the same rule.
2Also called prioritized logic program by some authors, as eg.
in [31, 8].
3Some authors, eg. [8], attribute relation < the inverse mean-
ing.
The overall idea behind the obtained semantics for ordered
logic program is to distinguish the “preferred” answers of
a program (Π, <) by means of fixpoint equations. That is,
a set of literals X constitutes a collection of preferred an-
swers from (Π, <), if it satisfies the equation C(Π,<)(X) =
X for some operator C(Π,<). In view of the classical logic
programming approach described in Section 2, this makes
us investigate semantics that interpret preferences as induc-
ing selection functions on the set of standard answer sets of
the underlying non-ordered program Π.
Standard answer sets are defined via a reduction of ex-
tended logic programs to basic programs. Such a reduction
is inappropriate when resolving conflicts among rules by
means of preferences since all such conflicts are simulta-
neously resolved when turning Π into ΠX . Rather conflict
resolution must be addressed among the original rules in or-
der to account for blockage between rules. In fact, once the
negative body body−(r) is eliminated there is no way to de-
tect whether head(r′) ∈ body−(r) holds in case of r < r′.
Our idea is therefore to characterize preferred answer sets
by an inductive development that agrees with the given or-
dering rather than a simultaneous reduction. In terms of a
standard answer set X , this means that we favor its formal




Π,X∅ over X = Cn(Π
X).
This leads us to the following definition. 4
Definition 1 Let (Π, <) be an ordered logic program and
let X and Y be sets of literals.
We define the set of immediate consequences of X with re-






I . r active wrt (X,Y );
II . there is no rule r′
with r < r′such that
(a) r′ active wrt (Y,X)
(b) head(r′) 6∈ X


if X is consistent, and T(Π,<),YX = Lit otherwise.
Note that T(Π,<),Y is a refinement of its classical counter-
part TΠ,Y . To see this, observe that Condition I embodies
the standard application condition for rules given in (2)
The actual refinement takes place in Condition II. The idea
is to apply a rule r only if the “question of applicability”
has been settled for all higher-ranked rules r′. Let us il-
lustrate this in terms of iterated applications of T(Π,<),Y .
In these cases, X contains the set of conclusions that have
been derived so far, while Y provides the putative answer
set (or: Lit \ Y provides a set of literals that can be falsi-
4Fixpoint operators for the approaches in [8] and [13] are ob-
tained by appropriate modifications to Condition I and II in Defi-
nition 1; cf. [24].
fied). Then, the “question of applicability” is considered to
be settled for a higher ranked rule r′
• if the prerequisites of r′ will never be derivable, viz.
body
+(r′) 6⊆ Y , or
• if r′ is defeated by what has been derived so far, viz.
body
−(r) ∩X 6= ∅, or
• if r′ or another rule with the same head have already
applied, viz. head(r′) ∈ X .
The first two conditions show why activeness of r′ is stipu-
lated wrt (Y,X), as opposed to (X,Y ) in Condition I. The
last condition serves somehow two purposes: First, it de-
tects whether the higher ranked rule r′ has applied and, sec-
ond, it suspends the preference r < r′ whenever the head of
the higher ranked has already been derived by another rule.
This suspension of preference constitutes a distinguishing
feature of the approach at hand; this is discussed in detail
in [24] in connection with other approaches to preference
handling.
As with TΠ and TΠ,Y , iterated applications of T(Π,<),Y are
written as T j(Π,<),Y for j ≥ 0, where T
0
(Π,<),YX = X
and T i(Π,<),YX = T(Π,<),Y T
i−1
(Π,<),YX for i ≥ 1. This
allows us to define the counterpart of fixpoint operator CΠ
for ordered programs:
Definition 2 Let (Π, <) be an ordered logic program and
let X be a set of literals.





In analogy to T(Π,<),Y and TΠ,Y , operator C(Π,<) is a re-
finement of its classical counterpart CΠ. The major differ-
ence of our definition from van Gelder’s is that we directly
obtain the consequences from Π (and Y ). Unlike this, the
usual approach (without preferences) first obtains a basic
programΠY fromΠ and then the consequences are derived
from this basic program ΠY .
A preferred answer set is defined as a fixpoint of C(Π,<).
In analogy to van Gelder [27], we may define the alternat-
ing transformation for an ordered logic program (Π, <) as
A(Π,<)(X) = C(Π,<)(C(Π,<)(X)). A fixpoint of A(Π,<) is
called an alternating fixpoint of (Π, <). Given that C(Π,<)is
anti-monotonic [24], we get that A(Π,<)(X) is monotonic.
According to results tracing back to Tarski [25], this im-
plies that A(Π,<) possesses a least and a greatest fixpoint,
denoted by lfpA(Π,<) and gfpA(Π,<), respectively.
Different semantics of ordered logic programs are obtained
by distinguishing different subsets of the respective set of
alternating fixpoints. In fact, the preferred answer set se-
mantics constitute instances of the overall framework. To
see this, observe that each fixpoint of C(Π,<) is also a fix-
point of A(Π,<).
4 Preferring least alternating fixpoints?
Let us now investigate the least alternating fixpoint of
A(Π,<)and with it the comportment of the previous fix-
point operator in the setting of well-founded semantics. As
opposed to answer sets semantics, this semantics relies on
3-valued models (or, partial models). Such a model con-
sists of three parts: the set of true literals, the set of false
literals, and the set of unknown literals. Given that the
union of these three sets is Lit , it is sufficient to specify
two of the three sets for determining a 3-valued interpre-
tation. Accordingly, a 3-valued interpretation I is a pair
(X,Y ) where X and Y are sets of literals with X∩Y = ∅.
That is, L ∈ X means that L is true in I , while L ∈ Y
means that L is false in I . Otherwise, L is considered to be
unknown in I .
Well-founded semantics constitutes another major seman-
tics for logic programs. In contrast to answers sets seman-
tics, it aims at characterizing skeptical conclusions com-
prised in a single so-called well-founded model of the un-
derlying program. This model can be characterized within
the alternating fixpoint theory in terms of the least fix-
point of operator AΠ. That is, the well-founded model
of a program Π is given by the 3-valued interpretation
(lfpAΠ,Lit \ CΠlfpAΠ). Hence, it is sufficient to con-
sider the least alternating fixpoint of a program, since it
determines its well-founded model. We therefore refer to
the least alternating fixpoint of Π as the well-founded set
of Π. The set Lit \ CΠlfpAΠ is usually referred to as the
unfounded set of Π.
After extending these concepts to preference handling,
that is, substituting the classical operators AΠ and CΠ by
A(Π,<) and C(Π,<), respectively, one can show that (i) each
ordered logic program has a unique preferred well-founded
model; (ii) the preferred well-founded set is contained in
any preferred answer set (while the unfounded one is not);
and (iii) whenever we obtain a two-valued well-founded
model, its underlying well-founded set is the unique an-
swer set of the program.5
One often criticized deficiency of the standard well-
founded model is that it is too skeptical. Unfortunately, this
is not remedied by alternating the fixpoint operators of the
previous sections, no matter which strategy we consider.
To see this, consider the ordered logic program (Π3, <):
r1 = a ← not b
r2 = b ← not a
r2 < r1 (3)
5No matter whether we consider the fixpoint operators for the
approach in [28], [8], or [13], respectively.
The well-founded model ofΠ3 is given by (∅, ∅). The same
model is obtained by alternating operator C(Π3,<). Observe
that C(Π3,<)(∅) = {a, b} and C(Π3,<)({a, b}) = ∅. Conse-
quently, ∅ is the least alternating fixpoint of (Π3, <).
The question is now why these operators are still too skepti-
cal in defining well-founded semantics (although they work
nicely in the setting of answer sets and regular semantics).
In fact, the great advantage of a setting like that of answer
sets semantics is that we deal with direct fixpoint equations,
like C(Π,<)(X) = X , where the context X represents the
putative answer set. This is different in the setting of well-
founded semantics, where we usually start by applying an
operator to a rather small context, eg. initially the empty
set; this usually results in a larger set, sometimes even Lit ,
that constitutes then the context of the second application of
the operator. Now, looking at the underlying definitions, we
see that the actual preference handling condition, eg. Con-
dition II in Definition 1 takes advantage of X for deciding
applicability. The alternating character in the well-founded
setting does not support this sort of analysis since it cannot
provide the (putative) final result of the computation.
5 Towards a preferred well-founded
semantics
In view of the failure of the above fixpoint operator(s) in the
setting of well-founded semantics, the obvious question is
now whether an appropriate alternating fixpoint operation
is definable that yields a reasonable well-founded seman-
tics for ordered logic programs. As informal guidelines,
we would like that the resulting semantics (i) allows for de-
riving more conclusions than the standard well-founded se-
mantics by appeal to given preferences; (ii) coincides with
standard well-founded semantics in the absence of prefer-
ences; and finally (iii) approximates the previous preferred
answer sets semantics.
The standard well-founded model is defined by means of
the least fixpoint of the operator AΠ = CΠCΠ. As above,
we aim at integrating preferences by elaborating upon the
underlying immediate consequence operator TΠ,Y X given
in (2). As well, the basic idea is to modify this operator so
that more conclusions can be derived by employing pref-
erences. However, as discussed at the end of the previous
section, the alternating iterations of CΠ face two comple-
mentary situations: those with smaller contexts and those
with larger ones. Since preferences exploit these contexts,
it seems reasonable to distinguish alternating applications
or, at least, to concentrate on one such situation while deal-
ing with the other one in the standard way.6 For strength-
ening AΠ = CΠCΠ, we thus have two options: either we
make the outer operator derive more literals or we make the
6Such an approach is also pursued in [6].
inner operator derive less literals.
In what follows, we adopt the former option and elaborate
upon the outer operator. The general idea is then to reduce
the context considered in the second application of CΠ by
appeal to preferences in order to make more rules appli-
cable. For this purpose we remove those literals that are
derived by means of less preferred, defeated rules.
Definition 3 Let (Π, <) be an ordered logic program and
let X and Y be sets of literals.
We define the set of immediate consequences of X with re-
spect to (Π, <) and Y as









for all rules r′ ∈ Π,
if L = head(r′) and
body+(r′) ⊆ Y,
then r′ < r and
(head(r) ∪X) ∩ body−(r′) 6= ∅


if X is consistent, and T ◦(Π,<),YX = Lit otherwise.
We say that r defeats r′ wrt X if (head(r) ∪ X) ∩
body−(r′) 6= ∅. The set of removed literals Dr(X,Y ) con-
sists thus of those rule heads, all of whose corresponding
rules are less preferred than r and defeated by r or X , viz.
the literals derived so far. In fact, this condition only re-
moves a literal such as head(r′) from Y , if all of its appli-
cable generating rules like r′ are defeated by the preferred
rule r. Note that Dr(X,Y ) is normally different for different
rules r.
For illustration consider the rules in Π3. For X = ∅ and
Y = {a, b}, we get Dr1(∅,{a,b}) = {b} and D
r2
(∅,{a,b}) =
∅. In such a situation, activeness of r1 is checked wrt
(∅, {a, b} \ {b}) while that of r2 is checked wrt (∅, {a, b}).
When applying r1, the removal of Dr1(∅,{a,b}) = {b} from
context {a, b} allows us to discard the conclusion of the
less preferred rule r2 that is defeated by the preferred rule
r1. This example is continued below.
Notably, the choice of Dr(X,Y ) is one among many options.
Unfortunately, it leads beyond the scope of this paper to in-
vestigate the overall resulting spectrum, so that we concen-
trate on the above definition and discuss some alternatives
at the end of this section. From a general perspective, the
above definition offers thus a parameterizable framework
for defining well-founded semantics including preferences.
In analogy to the previous sections, we can define a conse-
quence operator as follows.
Definition 4 Let (Π, <) be an ordered logic program and
let X be a set of literals.






Of particular interest in view of an alternating fixpoint the-
ory is that C◦(Π,<) enjoys anti-monotonicity:
Theorem 1 Let (Π, <) be an ordered logic program and
X1, X2 sets of literals.
If X1 ⊆ X2, then C◦(Π,<)(X2) ⊆ C◦(Π,<)(X1).
Given this, we may define a new alternating transformation




Since both C◦(Π,<) and CΠ are anti-monotonic, A◦(Π,<) is
monotonic.
Definition 5 Let (Π, <) be an ordered logic program and
let X be a set of literals.
We define X as a preferred well-founded set of (Π, <) iff
lfpA◦(Π,<) = X .
By Tarski’s Theorem [25], we get that each ordered logic
program has a unique preferred well-founded set.
Theorem 2 Let (Π, <) be an ordered logic program.
Then, there is a unique preferred well-founded set of (Π, <
).
Given the notion of the preferred well-founded set, we de-
fine the preferred well-founded model of an ordered pro-
gram as follows.
Definition 6 Let (Π, <) be an ordered logic program and
let X be the well-founded set of (Π, <).
We define the preferred well-founded model of (Π, <) as
(X,Lit \ CΠ(X)).
It is well-known that the standard well-founded seman-
tics for extended logic programs has time complexity
O(n2) [29, 4]. The complexity of the preferred well-
founded semantics is still in polynomial time but it is in
O(n3). The reason is that we have to additionally compute
Dr(X,Y ) for each r ∈ Π.
We first obtain the following corollary to Theorem 2.
Corollary 3 Every ordered logic program has a unique
preferred well-founded model.
This result shows that our preferred well-founded seman-
tics is as robust as the standard well-founded semantics.
The relationship between the standard well-founded model
and the preferred well-founded model can be stated as fol-
lows.
Theorem 4 Let (X,Y ) be the preferred well-founded
model of (Π, <) and let (X ′, Y ′) be the well-founded
model of Π.
Then, we have
1. X ′ ⊆ X and Y ′ ⊆ Y and
2. (X,Y ) = (X ′, Y ′), if < = ∅.
Let us reconsider (Π3, <). While (∅, ∅) is the well-founded
model of Π3, its ordered counterpart (Π3, <) has the pre-
ferred well-founded model ({a}, {b}). To see this, observe
that CΠ3∅ = {a, b} and C◦(Π3,<)({a, b}) = {a}. Clearly,
{a} is a fixpoint of CΠ3 and C◦(Π3,<). Thus, {a} is an al-
ternating fixpoint of (Π3, <). Also, we see that ∅ is not
an alternating fixpoint. This implies that {a} is the least
alternating fixpoint of (Π3, <).
This example along with the last result show that pref-
erences allow us to strengthen the conclusions obtained
by the standard well-founded semantics. That is, when-
ever certain conclusions are not sanctioned in the standard
framework one may add appropriate preferences in order
to obtain these conclusions within the overall framework
of well-founded semantics.
For a complement, consider the following variation of
(Π3, <), also discussed in [6].
r1 = a ← not b
r2 = b ← not c
r2 < r1 (4)
Observe that Π4 has well-founded model ({b}, {a, c}). In
contrast to (Π3, <), the preferred well-founded model of
(Π4, <) is also ({b}, {a, c}). As discussed in [6] this makes
sense since preferences should only enrich but not “over-
ride” an underlying well-founded model.
Another attractive property of this instance of preferred
well-founded semantics is that it provides an approxima-
tion of preferred answer sets semantics.
Theorem 5 Let (X,Y ) be the preferred well-founded
model of (Π, <) and let Z be a preferred answer set of
(Π, <).
Then, we have X ⊆ Z and Y ⊆ Lit \ Z .
Notably, this can be shown for all aforementioned preferred
answer sets semantics, no matter whether we consider the
approach in [28], [8], or [13], respectively.
Finally, let us briefly discuss some alternative choices for
Dr(X,Y ). In fact, whenever we express the same prefer-
ences among (negative) rules having the same head the
previous definition of Dr(X,Y ) is equivalent to {head(r′) |
r′ < r and (head (r) ∪ X) ∩ body−(r′) 6= ∅}. However,
this conceptually simpler definition is inadequate when it
comes to attributing different preferences to rules with the
same heads as in the following example.
Consider the ordered program (Π5, <).
r1 = a ←
r2 = b ← not a
r3 = a ← not b
r3 < r2 < r1 (5)
The preferred well-founded semantics of (Π5, <) gives
({a}, {b}), while the conceptually simpler one yields
({a, b}, ∅), a clearly wrong result! In the simplistic setting
Dr2(∅,{a,b}) would contain the head of the third rule, discard-
ing the fact that r1 already defeats r2.
Another alternative choice for Dr(X,Y ) is indicated by the
difference between the strategies employed in [28] and
[13]. In fact, the latter implicitly distinguishes between
same literals stemming from different rules. This amounts
to distinguishing different occurrences of literals. For this,
we may rely on the aforementioned simplistic definition of
Dr(X,Y ) and suppose that head(r) provides us with occur-
rences of literals, like br2 instead of b. Without entering
details, let us illustrate this idea by appeal to (Π5, <). An
approach distinguishing occurrences of literals would yield
CΠ5∅ = {a
r1 , br2 , ar3} and C◦(Π5,<)({a
r1 , br2 , ar3}) =
{ar1 , ar3}. When considering r2, we check activeness wrt
(∅, {ar1, br2 , ar3}\{ar3}), viz. (∅, {ar1 , br2}). Unlike just
above, ar1 remains in the reduced context and r2 is inap-
plicable. An elaboration of this avenue is beyond the scope
of this paper, in particular, since it involves an occurrence-
based development of well-founded semantics.
6 Relationships
In contrast to answer set semantics, the extension of well-
founded semantics to ordered logic program has been
rarely studied before. In this section we will discuss the
relation of our approach to [6, 21, 30].
6.1 Relation to Brewka’s Approach
Brewka defines in [6] a well-founded semantics for ordered
logic programs. Notably, this approach is based on a para-
consistent extension of well-founded semantics that toler-
ates inconsistencies among the result of the inner operator
without trivializing the overall result. Despite this devia-
tion from standard well-founded semantics, the question re-
mains whether Brewka’s semantics can be captured within
our semantical framework.
In fact, both approaches are based on quite different intu-
itions. While the underlying idea of Brewka’s approach
is to define a criterion for selecting the intended rules by
employing preference, we integrate preferences into the
immediate consequence operaor by individually restricting
the context of application for each rule.
Nonetheless, it turns out that Brewka’s semantics can be
captured through an alternating fixpoint construction. As
we show below, Brewka’s modification boils down to us-
ing an alternate fixpoint operator of the form “C⋆(Π,<)C
⋆
Π”.
To this end, let us first consider the difference among the
underlying operators C⋆Π and CΠ. Define Cl(Π) as the
smallest set of literals which is closed under a basic pro-
gram Π. Then, given a set X of literals, C⋆Π(X) is defined
as Cl(ΠX). Dropping the requirement of logical closure
results in a paraconsistent inference operation. For exam-
ple, given Π = {a←,¬a←, b←}, we get Cn(Π) = Lit ,
while Cl(Π) = {a,¬a, b}. Although the corresponding
adaptions are more involved, the surprising result is now
that Brewka’s semantics can also be captured within our
overall framework, if we use the closure operator Cl in-
stead of Cn .
Moreover, we need the following. Let (Π, <) be an ordered
logic program and X be a set of literals. We define ΠrX as
the set of rules defeated by r wrt X and < as
ΠrX = {r
′ ∈ Π | r′ < r, r defeats r′ wrt X}.
Notice that ΠrX is a set of rules while Dr(X,Y ) is a set of
literals. ΠrX is also different from Brewka’s Dom (set of
dominated rules) in thatΠrX is defined wrt a setX of literals
rather than a set of rules.
Write (ΠrX)+ = {(r′)+ | r′ ∈ ΠrX}. Let T ⋆(Π,<) be the
operator obtained from T ◦(Π,<) (in Definition 3) by replac-
ing Y \ Dr(X,Y ) with Cl(Π
Y \ (ΠrX)
+). This results in a
fixpoint operator C⋆(Π,<).
As we show in the full version of this paper, Brewka’s
well-founded set corresponds to the least fixpoint of the
alternating operator C⋆(Π,<)C
⋆
Π. This means Brewka’s well-
founded semantics also enjoys an alternating fixpoint char-
acterization.
6.2 Relation to Other Approaches
In [30], it is mentioned that a well-founded semantics with
preference can be defined in terms of their operator but de-
fault negation is not allowed in their syntax. However, even
for ordered logic programs without default negation, our
basic semantic approach is different from the well-founded
semantics in priority logic [30]. The main reason is that
they interpret the priority relation r < r′ in a quite differ-
ent way: r is blocked whenever r′ is applicable. While we
attribute to the program
r1 = p ←
r2 = q ←
r2 < r3 (6)
a preferred well-founded model, containing both p and q,
the well-founded model of Π6 in priority logic is {p}. That
is, q cannot be inferred.
Another skeptical semantics for preference is defeasible
logic, which was originally introduced by D. Nute [21] and
received extensive studies in recent years [1, 2, 20]. De-
feasible logic distinguishes the strict rules from defeasible
rules. This already makes its semantics different from our
preferred well-founded semantics.
Consider an example from [7]. The following is a theory in
defeasible logic:
r′1 ⇒ p





In defeasible logic, +δq is not derivable, i. e., q cannot be
defeasibly derived. As pointed out by Brewka, this means
a defeasible rule having higher priority can defeat a strict
rule.
The above theory can be directly translated into an ordered
logic program (Π, <) as follows:
r1 = p ← not ¬p
r2 = q ← p
r3 = ¬q ← not q
r2 < r3 (8)
It can be verified that the preferred well-founded model (in
our sense) is {p, q}. Therefore, q is derivable under our
preferred well-founded semantics.
7 Conclusion
We have looked into the issue of how van Gelder’s alter-
nating fixpoint theory [27] for normal logic programs can
be suitably extended to define the well-founded semantics
for ordered logic programs (extended logic programs with
preference). The key of the alternating fixpoint approach is
how to specify a suitable consequence relation for ordered
logic programs. We argue that the preference strategies for
defining answer sets are not suitable for defining preferred
well-founded semantics and then some informal criteria for
preferred well-founded semantics are proposed. Based on
this analysis, we have defined a well-founded semantics
for ordered logic programs. This semantics allows an el-
egant definition and satisfies some attractive properties: (1)
Each ordered logic program has a unique preferred well-
founded model; (2) The preferred well-founded reasoning
is no less skeptical than the standard well-founded reason-
ing; (3) Any conclusion under the preferred well-founded
semantics is also derivable under some major preferred an-
swer sets semantics. Our semantics is different from defea-
sible logic and the skeptical priority logic. An important re-
sult is the equivalence of Brewka’s preferred well-founded
semantics and our semantics introduced in Section 5.
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